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Summary: As it is known, export is a positive economic phenomenon that is desired to be realized for all countries. From this 
point of view the effect of institutional factors in the public sphere on export was investigated in 36 OECD countries for the 
period between 2002-2018. Four different models were established in the study and export was defined as the dependent 
variable in all models. In the first model it is determined that there is a negative relationship between the control of corruption 
and export. In the second model it was determined that there is an inverse relationship between regulatory quality and export. 
In the third model it is observed that there is a similar relationship between political stability and exports. In the fourth model 
that investigates the possible effect of the rule of law on exports there was no statistically significant relationship between the 
relevant variables.
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Public administration policies and political 
decisions cannot be considered seperately from 
economic developments. Capital investments, 
planning of manpower, distribution of 
resources, economic cooperation, role of the 
private sector are planned by governments, 
with taking into consideration the global and 
national economic order. in this study, an 
answer is searched for the question to which 
extent parameters such as the control of 
corruption, regulatory quality, political stability 
and the rule of law, among the institutional 
factors in the public sphere affects the export.
As it is known, corruption is defined 
as the abuse of public service for private 
interests. it has the ability to stabilize or 
destabilize the political system because of its 
structure (Farzanegan and Witthuhn, 2017: 
48). There is a worldwide increasing concern 
about corruption, which is now universal it is 
closely related to the idea that it will hinder 
the economic development process and to 
play a central role in politics. today, not only 
the public and private sectors, but also non-
profit organizations and charities in developed 
and developing countries are subject to 
corruption. (Myint, 2000: 33). Beyond any 
doubt, corruption provokes inefficiency 
instrumentally. Waste of resources, decrease 
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in per capita income, negative shift in 
employment are the main ones of that fact. 
Corruption also affects negatively the tax 
revenues and service quality by weakening 
trust in public officials (Rose, 2018: 220).
Regulatory quality is a complex concept 
that has several parameters on its own. its 
normative dimension stands out more. it 
includes setting goals for management, 
clarifying the scope of public interventions, 
impartiality, good governance and transparent 
regulation (Radaelli and Francesco, 2004). 
it is within the scope of regulatory quality 
that governments encourage private sector 
development, formulate the policies that 
facilitate private sector initiatives (Nistotskaya 
and Cingolani, 2015: 10; info.worldbank.org, 
2020). 
For economic growth, social welfare and 
environmental protection it is needed to 
establish rules. However, rules can sometimes 
be costly, both economically and socially. What 
is needed to be done is to create a more efficient 
and cost-effective regulatory quality system 
without removing existing rules. in that way, 
governments improve existing rules by drafting 
good and new rules. By removing individual 
rules that contradicts with each other, well 
prepared regulations are meant to be subject of 
the system parts (OeCd, 2008: 1).
Political stability is a necessary condition 
for the optimal functioning of the economy. 
economic growth, income inequality, 
inflation, the level of poverty, fiscal and 
monetary policy decisions are variables that 
affect political stability. in the short and long 
term, political stability supports economic 
growth, provided by private representatives 
and government policy decisions (Cervantes 
and Villasenor, 2015: 79-81). Political 
instability has a negative impact on economic 
growth. The reason of this is that it disrupts 
market activities and working relations by 
negatively affecting production. Besides, in 
times of political instability, the investment 
level will be low (Radu, 2015: 752).
Rule of law expresses the authority of legal 
rules over government actions and the behavior 
of individuals. Hence, it is the antithesis of 
tyrannical rule that both government and 
individuals are bound by the law (Valcke, 
2020). The law is equitable; it is stable and 
predictable; it applies equally to everyone in 
similar circumstances; superior to all members 
of society, including government officials 
with legislative, executive and judicial powers 
(Stein, 2009: 302).On that sense, it is a system 
that tries to protect the rights of citizens from 
the arbitrary acts and abuses of government 
power (Yu and Guernsey, 2020).  
LItErAturE
One of the first studies to examine the possible 
relationship between corruption and foreign 
trade was carried out by Krueger (1974). in his 
study, Krueger emphasized the importance of 
having an import license for companies dealing 
with foreign trade in an environment where 
imports are restricted by quantity restrictions 
and argued that companies may compete with 
each other and even do unlawful things in 
order to obtain this license.
Bhagwati (1982) argues in his study that, 
in a competitive economic environment, 
businesses can try to circumvent tariffs 
and resort to illegal means such as customs 
smuggling. According to him, these enterprises 
do not contribute significantly to production, 
but by developing close relations with the 
government, they set out to obtain rent and 
increase their income.
Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) investigated 
the impact of terrorism on international trade 
in their study. According to the findings of the 
study, which bounded with the 1960-1993 
period and covers more than 200 countries, 
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it was observed that terrorist acts narrow the 
volume of foreign trade.
Clarke (2005) conducted a research on the 
factors determining the export performance 
of enterprises operating in the manufacturing 
industry in his study, which included 8 African 
countries. in his study, where he collected data 
through surveys covering the years 2002 and 
2003, he found that manufacturing firms 
were less likely to export in countries with 
restrictive trade and customs regulations and 
poor customs administration.
Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007) studied 
78 countries for the period of 2000-2004 
and investigated the relationship between 
facilities provided for trade, regulatory 
quality and export performance. in their 
findings, they determined that a 10 percent 
improvement in trade facilitation would 
provide a 5 percent increase in exports. in 
additionto this; While trade facilitation can 
contribute to improving export performance, 
it confirms that improvements in regulatory 
quality as well as the quality of basic transport 
and communication infrastructure are 
more important to export performance and 
accelerate export growth.
Dutt and Traca (2010) examined the 
relationship between corruption and foreign 
trade in their study within the context of 
extortion effect and evasion effect. According 
to the authors; Corrupting customs officials 
in the importing country taking bribes from 
exporters (extortion effect); and subsequently, 
if it allows exporters to avoid tariff barriers, 
corruption can increase trade. (evasion effect). 
in the empirical findings of the study, especially 
in the case of high tariffs, it has been observed 
that the extortions taken by customs officials 
and causing corruption increased foreign trade.
Musila and Sigué (2010) investigated the 
impact of corruption on foreign trade in 
African countries for the period between 
1998-2007. in the empirical findings of this 
study, they observed that corruption affects 
foreign trade negatively.
Yu et al. (2015) investigated the relationship 
between trade, trust and the rule of law in 16 
european countries for the period between 
1996-2009. in the findings obtained; it is 
emphasized that the positive effect of trust on 
trade is determined by the quality of the rule 
of law. Additionally, it has been observed that 
when the rule of law in the importing country 
increases compared to the exporting country, 
the effect of trust on trade decreases.
in the study conducted by Gezikol and 
Tunahan (2018), in the low-income country 
group for the period between 1995-2015, 
it has been observed that the increase in 
exports resulted in increased corruption. in 
the low-middle income country group, it was 
determined that the increase in imports and 
exports again resulted in increased corruption.
in Soyyiğit and Doğan (2020) studies, for the 
period between 2000-2017, in the countries 
of the Commonwealth of independent States; 
They investigated the relationship between 
institutional factors, exports and foreign 
direct investments. in the empirical findings 
obtained; A one-sided causality relationship 
from the rule of law to export and political 
stability has been identified. in addition, a 
unidirectional causality relationship has been 
observed from the government’s effectiveness 
to exports and foreign direct investments.
in the next part of the study, at first place, 
brief information will be given about the data 
and method used in the analysis. Afterwards; 
The research findings will be reported and the 
conclusion part will take place lastly.
DAtA AnD MEtHOD 
in this study, the effects of corruption control, 
political stability, regulatory quality and the 
rule of law on exports, which are among the 
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institutional factors that have an impact on 
the public sphere for the period 2002-2018 
in the context of 36 OeCd countries, were 
investigated using panel data analysis. The 
data used in the study are shown in the Table 1 
below with their sources.
As can be seen in the table above, all of the 
series were obtained from the World Bank. 
Logarithmic transformation was applied to 
dLeXP and dLGdP series that did not have 
negative values, and other series that had 
negative values in observations of some years 
were added to the model in their original form.
to explain the variables representing 
institutional factors; the corruption control 
index, in the context of all forms of corruption, 
regardless of whether they are minor or largely, 
it measures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is used for private gain, as well 
as the administration of the state by the elite 
and private interests. Regulatory quality index; 
it measures perceptions of the government’s 
ability to form and implement solid policies 
that allow and encourage private sector 
development. The political stability index 
measures perceptions of political stability and 
the absence of violence, political instability, 
including terrorism, and / or the possibility 
of politically motivated violence. The rule of 
law index, on the other hand, measures the 
perceptions of the representatives regarding 
how much they trust and obey the rules of the 
society and especially the contract practices, 
property rights, the quality of the police 
and courts, and the possibility of crime and 
violence. For these four indices of institutional 
factors, the estimate gives the country’s score 
between approximately –2.5 and 2.5. in 
addition, descriptive statistics for all series are 
reported in the Table 2.
Since the data set used in this study is 
a panel data set, panel data analysis was 
preferred as a method. First, unit root test 
was applied to determine the stationarities 
of the series. Second generation panel unit 
root tests can make consistent estimates in 
series when cross-sectional dependency is in 
question. For this reason, firstly, the presence 
of cross-sectional dependency in series was 
investigated. Because in the panel data set used 
in the study N>T, cross section dependency 
was investigated with the Peseran Cd LM test 
proposed by Peseran (2004). if the probility 
value obtained as a result of the Peseran Cd 
LM test is less than 5% significance level, the 
H0 hypothesis, which states that there is no 
Table 1
Data anD SourceS
Variable code Variable name Source
DLEXP Exports of goods and services (constant 2010) WDI
DCOr Control of Corruption Index WDI
DrEG regulatory Quality Index WDI
DPOL Political Stability and Absence of Violence/terrorism Index WDI
DLAW rule of Law Index WDI
DLGDP GDP (constant 2010 uS$) WDI
DFDI Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) WDI
Source: own edited
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cross-sectional dependency, is rejected, and 
the H1 hypothesis expressing the presence of 
cross-section dependence is accepted. if the 
probility value is greater than 5% significance 
level, the H0 hypothesis is accepted and the 
H1 hypothesis is rejected.
in the case of cross-sectional dependency in 
the series, the Peseran CiPS unit Root test, 
which is one of the second generation unit 
root tests and can make consistent predictions 
under the assumption of cross-section 
dependency, has been investigated for the 
stationarities of the series. After determining 
the stationarities, the differences of the non-
stationary series were taken and the models 
were established.
in the F test test of the models, if the 
probility value of the F test is less than 
5% significance level, the hypothesis ‘H0: 
Classical model is suitable’ is rejected and 
the alternative ‘H1: Classical model is not 
suitable’ hypothesis is accepted. Therefore, it 
is understood that unit/time effective models 
are available in this case. if the probility value 
of the F test is greater than 5% significance 
level, the hypothesis ‘H0: Classical model is 
suitable’ is accepted and the alternative ‘H1: 
Classical model is not suitable’ hypothesis 
is rejected. in other words, in this case, it is 
decided that unit/time effective models are 
not available, instead the classical model is 
suitable.
Hausman (1978) test was used to 
determine the fixed and random effects 
in the models. if the probility value of the 
Hausman test is statistically less than 5% 
significance level, the hypothesis ‘H0: The 
difference between the parameters is not 
systematic’ is rejected and the alternative 
‘H1: The difference between the parameters 
is systematic’ hypothesis is accepted. in other 
words, it is understood that fixed effects 
model is valid in models. if the probility 
value of Hausman test is statistically greater 
than 5% significance level, the hypothesis 
‘H0: The difference between the parameters is 
not systematic’ is accepted and the alternative 
‘H1: The difference between the parameters 
is systematic’ hypothesis is rejected. in other 
words, it is understood that the random 
effects model is valid in models.
This method has the ability to make 
consistent estimates even in the presence 
of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems in the model (Yerdelen tatoğlu, 
2018: 101). in addition, there are versions of 
this method that can be used in both random 
effect models and fixed effect models. in the 
Table 2
Summary StatiSticS about Data
Variable mean min. max. Std. Dev. obs
DLEXP 0.0448 –0.2669 0.3312 0.0643 576
DCOr –0.0066 –0.3705 0.3380 0.0945 576
DrEG –0.0001 –0.3041 0.5722 0.0936 576
DPOL –0.0215 –0.7468 0.5526 0.1467 576
DLAW –0.0015 –0.2577 0.2542 0.0710 576
DLGDP 26.6891 23.1230 30.5134 1.5907 576
FDI 5.0513 –58.3229 86.5891 10.7765 612
Source: own edited
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study, Generalized Least Squares Method was 
used considering these versions.
different tests were used for fixed and 
random effect models in determining 
heteroskedasticity problem in models. 
Modified Wald test, which is recommended 
to be used in fixed effect models, was preferred 
in determining the heteroscedasticity problem 
for fixed effect models. if the probility value of 
this test is statistically less than 5% significance 
level; The hypothesis of ‘H0: Variance is 
constant with respect to units’ is rejected and 
the alternative ‘H1: Variance is not constant 
with respect to units’ hypothesis is accepted. 
in other words, it is concluded that there is 
a heteroscedasticity problem in the model. 
if the Probility value is statistically higher 
than 5% significance level; The hypothesis 
‘H0: Variance is constant with respect to units’ 
is accepted and the alternative ‘H1: Variance 
is not constant with respect to units’ hypothesis 
is rejected. in other words, it is decided that 
there is no heteroscedasticity problem in the 
model.
For determination of the heteroscedasticity 
problem, if random effect models are valid 
The tests developed by Levene (1960) and 
Brown and Forsythe (1974) were used. if the 
probility value of the relevant tests for different 
critical values (1%, 5%, 10%) is statistically 
lower than the 5% significance level, the 
H0 hypothesis, which states that there is no 
heteroskedasticity problem, is rejected, and 
the H1 hypothesis expressing that there is a 
problem of heteroskedasticity is accepted. if 
the Probility value is statistically higher than 
5% significance level; The H0 hypothesis, 
which states that there is no heteroskedasticity 
problem, is accepted, and the H1 hypothesis, 
which states that there is a heteroskedasticity 
problem, is rejected.
Bharagava, Franzi, and Narendranathan’s 
(1982) Durbin-Watson test and Baltagi 
and Wu’s (1999) best invariant test (LBi) 
were used to determine the autocorrelation 
problem in models. if the statistical value of 
both tests is less than 2, it is concluded that 
the autocorrelation problem in the model 
is important. if the statistic value is greater 
than 2; it is decided that the autocorrelation 
problem in the model is not important.
As mentioned before, the Generalized 
Least Squares Method has the ability to make 
consistent estimates even under the presence 
of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
However, in the study, consistent estimators 
were used to eliminate the related problems 
in the models. in the models where the fixed 
effect model is valid, the consistent estimator 
developed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998), which 
is suitable for fixed effect models, is preferred. 
The reason for choosing this estimator is that 
it can be used both in fixed effect models and 
if the N> t condition is valid in the panel data 
set. Random effect models are; The consistent 
estimator, which was developed by Arellano 
(1987), Froot (1989) and Rogers (1993), was 
used in the random effects model.
Four different models were used in the 
study. Representing export in all models, 
dLeXP series is the dependent variable. 
dLGdP series representing growth and Fdi 
series representing foreign direct investment 
inflows are control variables. installed models 
are as follows:
DLEXPit=β0+β1 DCOR+β2 DLGDP+β3 FDI+εit (1)
DLEXPit=β0+β1 DREG+β2 DLGDP+β3 FDI+εit (2)
DLEXPit=β0+β1 DPOL+β2 DLGDP+β3 FDI+εit (3)
DLEXPit=β0+β1 DLAW+β2 DLGDP+β3 FDI+εit (4)
in the first model, the dCOR series 
representing the control of corruption; 
in the second model, the dReG series 
representing regulatory quality; 
in the third model, the effect of the dPOL 
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series representing political stability and the 
dLAW series representing the rule of law; 
in the fourth model on the dLeXP series 
representing exports, were investigated.  
Analysis results will be reported in the next 
part of the study. Then it will continue with 
the results section.
AnALySIS rESuLtS
in the study, before starting panel data analysis, 
relevant tests were used to test the unit roots 
of the series. As is known, it is suggested to 
use second generation unit root tests in case 
of structural break in series. Since N> t in 
the data set used in the study, the Peseran Cd 
LM test recommended by Peseran (2004) 
was used to determine the cross-sectional 
dependency of the series. information on test 
results is shown in the Table 3 below.
As can be seen in the table above, it is 
understood that the probility values of 
all models are statistically less than 5% 
significance level. in other words, the H0 
hypothesis, which states that there is no cross-
sectional dependency, was rejected, and the 
H1 hypothesis, which expresses the presence 
of cross-section dependence, was accepted. 
Since it was understood that there is cross 
section dependency in models, it was decided 
to use one of the second generation unit root 
tests considering the cross section dependency. 
in this context, the Peseran CiPS test, one 
of the second generation unit root tests, was 
preferred and the stationarity results for the 
series are reported in the Table 4 below.
As seen in the above table of the Peseran 
CiPS unit root test results, only Fdi series are 
stationary in i (0); all other series are stationary 
in i (1). After the non-stationary series in i (0) 
were made stable in i (1) by taking their first 
differences, the models were established and the 
estimation phase was started. The estimation 
results made with the generalized least squares 
method are reported in the Table 5 below.
As seen in the table below, the dLeXP 
series representing exports in all models is the 
dependent variable. in the results belonging to 
Model-1; 
•	dCOR series representing the control of 
corruption, with a coefficient of -0.0375, 
statistically negative at 10% significance; 
•	dLGdP series representing growth, 
with 1.3881 coefficient, the Fdi series 
representing foreign direct investments 
positively at 1% significance level, and 
•	dLeXP series representing exports with a 
statistically significant level of 5%, with a 
coefficient of 0.0004. 
in other words, it is seen that there is an 
inverse relationship between the control of 
corruption and exports. in other words, as 
the control of corruption increases, exports 
decrease and as the control of corruption 
decreases, exports increase.
Table 3
PeSeran cD Lm teSt reSuLtS
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Table 4
PeSeran ciPS unit root teSt reSuLtS
Variable model test Stat. 
critival Values
%10 %5 %1
DLEXP Constant –1.625 –22.11 –22.20 –22.36
Constant Linear tr. –2.142 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DLEXP Constant –3.275 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –3.620 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DCOr Constant –2.144 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –2.314 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DCOr Constant –3.862 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –3.962 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DrEG Constant –1.572 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –2.553 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DrEG Constant –4.250 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –4.226 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DPOL Constant –2.034 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –2.313 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DPOL Constant –4.332 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –4.586 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DLAW Constant –1.833 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –2.469 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DLAW Constant –4.054 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –4.143 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DLGDP Constant –1.243 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –1.763 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
DLGDP Constant –2.919 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –3.077 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
FDI Constant –3.447 –2.11 –2.20 –2.36
Constant Linear tr. –3.556 –2.63 –2.71 –2.85
Source: own edited
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in the results for Model-2; 
•	dReG series representing regulatory 
quality, with a coefficient of -0.0535, 
statistically negative at 5% significance 
level; 
•	dLGdP series representing growth, 
with a coefficient of 1.3610, statistically 
positive at 1% significance level
•	and the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments affects the dLeXP 
series, which represents exports positively 
at a 10% significance level with a 
coefficient of 0.0004. 
in other words, it is seen that there is an 
inverse relationship between regulatory quality 
and export. in other words; As the regulatory 
quality increases, exports decrease and as the 
regulatory quality decreases, exports increase.
Table 5
eStimation reSuLtS (GeneraLizeD LeaSt SquareS)
Depended Variable: DLeXP
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(0.0030)
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number of Obs 576 576 576 576
number of Country 36 36 36 36
r2 47 48 48 47


















Model Fixed Effect random Effect random Effect random Effect
*Note: Values in parantheses are probility values, others are coefficients.
Source: own edited
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in the results belonging to Model-3; 
•	dPOL series representing political 
stability, with a coefficient of 0.0387, 
statistically positive at 1% significance 
level; 
•	dLdGP series representing growth, 
with a coefficient of 1.3274, statistically 
positive at 1% significance level 
•	and Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 5%. 
in other words, there is a directly related 
relationship between political stability and 
exports. As the political stability increases, 
exports increase and as the political stability 
decreases, exports decrease.
in the results belonging to Model-4; it 
is seen that the dLAW series representing 
the rule of law does not have a statistically 
significant effect on exports. However, with 
the coefficient of 1.3437, the dLGdP series 
representing growth, statistically, at the level 
of 1% significance and Fdi series representing 
foreign direct investments with a coefficient 
of 0.0004, with a statistical significance of 
10%, positively affects the dLeXP series 
representing export. The findings are shown in 
Figure 1.
The table below shows the results of the 
diagnostic tests for the models. different tests 
were used to determine autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity problems, depending on 
whether the models are fixed and randomly 
effective models. As can be seen in the Table 
6 below, it is understood that there are 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems 
in all models. Consistent estimators were 
consulted to solve the related problems and 
the results were reported in the relevant table 
showing the results of the consistent estimators.
Consistent estimators were used to eliminate 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems in the models and the results are 
reported in the Table 7 below. Since the fixed 
effects model is valid in Model-1 and the panel 
data set used is shaped as N> t, the consistent 
estimator developed by driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) was used for this model.  As can be 
seen in the results obtained for Model-1; 
•	dCOR series representing the control 
of corruption, with –0.0375 coefficient, 
statistically negative at 1% significance 
level; 
•	representing growth, the dLGdP series, 
with a coefficient of 1.3881, positively 
•	and Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 1%. 
in other words, there is an inverse 
relationship between corruption control and 
export. As the control of corruption increases, 
exports decrease and conversely, as the control 
of corruption decreases, exports increase.
in order to overcome the heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems in Model-2, the 
current version of the consistent estimator 
in the random effects model, developed by 
Arellano (1987), Froot (1989) and Rogers 
(1993), was used. As can be seen in the Table 
7, in the findings obtained; 
•	dReG series representing regulatory 
quality, with a coefficient of –0.0535, 
statistically negative at 1%; 
•	with the coefficient of 1.3610 of the 
dLGdP series representing growth, 
statistically positive at 1% significance 
level 
•	and the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 1%. 
in other words, there is an inverse 
relationship between regulatory quality and 
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Table 6
DiaGnoStic teStS reSuLtS for moDeLS
model-1 model-2 model-3 model-4
Model Fixed Effect random Effect random Effect random Effect





Baltagi-Wu test Stat. 1.9825 1.9873 1.9852 1.8959
Durbin- Watson test Stat. 1.9012 1.9018 1.9066 1.9777
Critival Values (Levene, Brown 
ve Forsthe test Stat. & Prob.)
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export. in other words, as the regulatory 
quality increases, exports decrease and 
conversely, as the regulatory quality decreases, 
exports increase.
in order to overcome the heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems in Model-3, the 
consistent estimator, which was developed by 
Arellano (1987), Froot (1989) and Rogers 
(1993), was used in the random effects model. 
As seen in the table above; 
•	with the coefficient 0.0387 of the dPOL 
series representing political stability, 
the statistically positive direction at 1% 
significance level; 
•	with the coefficient of 1.3274 of the 
dLGdP series representing growth, 
statistically positive at 1% significance 
leveland and 
•	the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant 1% level. 
in other words, there is a similar relationship 
between political stability and exports. As the 
political stability increases, exports increase 
and as the political stability decreases, exports 
decrease.
Table 7
eStimation reSuLtS (conSiStent eStimatorS)
Depended Variable: DLeXP







DPOL – – 0.0387*
(0.0060)
–


























Method Driscoll-Kray Consistent Estimators Consistent Estimators Consistent Estimators
r2 47 48 48 47
number of Obs 576 576 576 576
number of Country 36 36 36 36
Note: *Values in parantheses are probility values, others are coefficients.
Source: own edited
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in order to overcome the heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation problems in Model-4, the 
consistent estimator, which was developed by 
Arellano (1987), Froot (1989) and Rogers 
(1993), was used in the random effects model. 
As seen in the table above; 
•	the dLGdP series, which represents 
growth from the control variables, with a 
coefficient of 1.3437, statistically positive 
at 1% significance level and 
•	the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 1%. 
On the other hand, the dLAW series 
representing the rule of law could not have a 
statistically significant effect on exports. 
COnCLuSIOn
in this study, for the period of 2002-2018 
in the context of 36 OeCd countries, the 
effects of corruption control, political stability, 
regulatory quality and the rule of law, which 
are among the institutional factors that affect 
the public sphere, on exports were investigated 
using panel data analysis. Four different 
models were established in the study, and 
export was defined as the dependent variable 
in all models.
in Model-1, the effect of control of 
corruption on exports has been investigated. 
Growth and foreign direct investment inflow 
are included in the model as control variables. 
in the estimation made by the generalized least 
squares method, in the results belonging to 
Model-1; 
•	dCOR series representing the control of 
corruption, with a coefficient of -0.0375, 
statistically negative at 10% significance 
level; 
•	dLGdP series representing growth, 
with a coefficient of 1.3881, statistically 
positive at 1% significance level, and 
•	the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 5%. 
That is to say, it is seen that there is an inverse 
relationship between the control of corruption 
and exports. in other words, as the control of 
corruption increases, exports decrease and as 
the control of corruption decreases, exports 
increase.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems were detected in Model-1. Since 
fixed effects are valid in the model and the 
panel data set used is formed as N> t, the 
consistent estimator developed by driscoll 
and Kraay (1998) was used to solve the related 
problems. in the results obtained; 
•	dCOR series representing the control 
of corruption, with –0.0375 coefficient, 
statistically negative at 1% significance 
level; 
•	representing growth, the dLGdP series, 
with a coefficient of 1.3881, positivelyand 
Fdi series representing foreign direct 
investments, with a coefficient of 0.0004, 
positively affects the dLeXP series 
representing exports at a statistically 
significant 1% level. 
Although the result did not change, it 
was observed that there was an increase in 
statistical significance.
in Model-2, the effect of regulatory quality 
on exports has been investigated. Again, 
growth and foreign direct investment inflows 
are included in the model as control variables. 
in the estimation made with the generalized 
least squares method, in the results of Model-2; 
•	dReG series representing regulatory 
quality, with a coefficient of -0.0535, 
statistically negative at 5% significance 
level; 
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•	dLGdP series representing growth, 
with a coefficient of 1.3610, statistically 
positive at 1% significance level and 
•	Fdi series, which represents foreign direct 
investments, affects the dLeXP series, 
which represents exports positively at a 
10% significance level with a coefficient 
of 0.0004. 
Particularly, it is seen that there is a 
reverse relationship between regulatory 
quality and export. That is; As the regulatory 
quality increases, exports decrease and as the 
regulatory quality decreases, exports increase.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems were detected in Model-2. Since 
the random effects are valid in the model, the 
version of the consistent estimator, which is 
valid in the random effects model, was used 
to solve the related problems. in the findings 
obtained; 
•	dReG series representing regulatory 
quality, with a coefficient of –0.0535, 
statistically negative at 1%; 
•	with the coefficient of 1.3610 of the 
dLGdP series representing growth, 
statistically positive at 1% significance 
level and 
•	the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant 1% level. Although the result 
has not changed, it is seen that there is an 
increase in statistical significance.
in Model-3, the effect of political stability 
on exports has been investigated. Growth and 
foreign direct investment inflow are included 
in the model as control variables. in the 
findings obtained; 
•	dPOL series representing political 
stability, with a coefficient of 0.0387, 
statistically positive at 1% significance 
level, 
•	dLdGP series representing growth, 
with a coefficient of 1.3274, statistically 
positive at 1% significance level and 
•	Fdi series representing foreign direct 
investments, with a coefficient of 0.0004, 
positively affects the dLeXP series 
representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 5%. 
in other words, there is a similar relationship 
between political stability and exports. As the 
political stability increases, exports increase 
and as the political stability decreases, exports 
decrease.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems were detected in Model-3. Since 
random effects are valid in the model, the 
version of the consistent estimator, which is 
valid in the random effects model, has been 
used to solve the related problems. in the 
results obtained;  
•	with the coefficient 0.0387 of the dPOL 
series representing political stability, 
statistically positive direction at 1% 
significance level; 
•	with the coefficient of 1.3274 of the 
dLGdP series representing growth, 
statistically positive at 1% significance 
leveland 
•	the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant 1% level. 
Although the result did not change, it 
was observed that there was an increase in 
statistical significance.
in Model-4, the effect of the rule of law 
on exports has been investigated. Growth 
and foreign direct investment inflow are 
included in the model as control variables. in 
the findings; it is seen that the dLAW series 
representing the rule of law does not have 
a statistically significant effect on exports. 
However, with the coefficient of 1.3437, 
the dLGdP series representing growth, 
 StudieS 
148  Public Finance Quarterly  2021/1
statistically, at the level of 1% significance and 
Fdi series, which represents foreign direct 
investments, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports with a statistically 
significant level of 10% with a coefficient of 
0.0004.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
problems were detected in Model-4. Since 
the random effects are valid in the model, the 
version of the consistent estimator, which is 
valid in the random effects model, was used 
to solve the related problems. in the results 
obtained; 
•	the dLGdP series, which represents 
growth from the control variables, with a 
coefficient of 1.3437, statistically positive 
at 1% significance level and 
•	the Fdi series representing foreign 
direct investments, with a coefficient of 
0.0004, positively affects the dLeXP 
series representing exports at a statistically 
significant level of 1%. 
However, the dLAW series representing 
the rule of law could not have a statistically 
significant effect on exports. 
The economic policies implemented by 
the governments can create some restrictions 
on foreign trade in terms of both their own 
interests and the sanctions of international 
law and international organizations. On the 
other hand, firms often tend to put their 
own interests ahead of those of national and 
international institutions and organizations. 
due to the restrictions of governments and 
international organizations, companies 
sometimes have difficulty in exporting. 
Therefore, as can be seen in the findings of 
this study, export and control of corruption 
have a negative relationship. Bhagwati (1982) 
points out to this finding in his study and 
argues that in an economic environment 
where competition is fierce, businesses may 
try to circumvent customs tariffs and resort 
to some illegal means such as customs 
smuggling.
in addition, in the study of Bhagwati 
(1982), it is argued that these enterprises, 
although not contributing significantly to 
production, started to obtain rent and increase 
their income by developing close relations 
with the government. to put it more clearly, 
these enterprises also demand the stable 
continuation of the government with which 
they have an association. Because the stable 
continuation of the current foreign trade of 
these enterprises depends on the ability of 
this government in the country to remain in 
power with political stability. in our study, 
a similar relationship was found between 
political stability and exports, confirming this 
relationship.
iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007) empirically 
observed that factors that facilitate trade in 
regulatory quality have a positive effect on 
export performance. in our study, we found 
that there is an invers relationship between 
regulatory quality and export. in other words, 
as the regulatory quality increases, public 
sanctions and legal regulations on exports 
increase. Therefore, an opposite relationship 
may arise between regulatory quality and 
exports as exports become difficult. This 
finding in our study is similar to that found in 
the studies of iwanow and Kirkpatrick.
Németh et al. (2019), in some studies such 
as, attention is drawn to the issue of the 
reliability of indices measuring corruption. in 
these studies, it is emphasized that corruption 
indexes may not reflect the truth. For this 
reason, it should be noted that we are more 
skeptical about the corruption findings in our 
study compared to other findings.
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